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I. THE JUNE 11 HEARING FATALLY PREJUDICED BROWN'S 
The Olches brush off the June 11 hearing two hours before 
trial as "unremarkable". To make the hearing appear 
"unremarkable", the Olches assert that (1) everyone knew the 
hearing would be for summary judgment; and (2) Brown's had no 
evidence to support its claim. Neither assertion is correct. 
A. The Trial Court Never Indicated the June 11 Hearing Would 
be a Summary Judgment Hearing. 
The concept of summary judgment arose at the June 6 hearing 
only in connection with Brown's request for ten trial days. The 
trial court had announced it would allow only seven. Brown's 
objected. (R. 1563-64) At that point the Olches' counsel alluded 
to a continuance of the June 11 trial, if the continuance would 
permit the Olches to bring a summary judgment motion: 
We are not afraid to try it. We are ready to try it. We 
are happy to try it. If they need more time, because I 
am the defendant. I don't want to do that. All the 
pressure bears on me. I don't want that. 
We have counterclaim. We are very serious about it. 
We need time. I would not oppose putting it off to two 
weeks in August. I have no idea what your Honor's 
calendar looks like, if we could have an opportunity to 
have a motion for summary judgment heard. (R. 1564) 
The Olches again made this point during the same hearing: 
If [Brown's] need additional time, then I would go 
along with that, if we could have just an hour's hearing 
on summary judgment. A modest request, I think. We 
ought not be afraid of it . . . 
MR. VAN DAM: Two different things going on here. 
I appreciate Mr. Burbidge's skillfully tying them 
together. I don't think the extension and a summary 
judgment motion ought to be synonymous or tied together. 
, . . (R.1566) 
The notion of a summary judgment hearing therefore arose 
solely as a possibility in the event of a continuance. Nothing 
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occurred at the June 6 hearing that gave any notice that a summary 
judgment hearing would evolve two hours before the June 11 trial. 
In fact, at the June 11 hearing the Olches' counsel showed 
their own understanding that the hearing was to be on purely legal 
issues: " [W] hat I want to do is keep it out of any realm of 
factual question." (R. 1321) The mere fact that Brown's counsel 
made a passing characterization of the June 11 hearing as "kind of 
arguing summary judgment" (R. 1569), does not establish that 
Browns' had any forewarning the June 11 hearing would evolve into 
a summary judgment hearing. To the contrary, Brown's objected to 
any effort of the trial court to do so: "We have had very little 
time. We never researched or responded to [the Olches'3 motion for 
summary j udgment."1 
B. Brown's Did Not Present, and Could Not Have Presented, 
All of its Evidence in the June 11 Hearing. 
In their effort to convince this Court that the Court of 
Appeals properly affirmed the dismissal of Brown's fraud claims as 
a matter of fact, not of law, the Olches contend at page 12 of 
their Brief: "Brown's did, in fact, tell the trial court at trial 
what evidence it had to support its fraud claim. [R. 13 02-07] . 
The problem was that Brown's had no evidence that was legally 
sufficient to support that claim." (Emphasis added). 
1
 Contrary to the Olches' assertion at page 9 of their brief 
that Brown's was successful at the hearing in obtaining the 
dismissal of the Olches' counterclaim based on lack of evidence, 
Brown's did no such thing. The trial court raised the issue sua 
sponte, and Brown's counsel gave two short answers totalling 
sixteen lines to questions the trial court directly posed. (R. 
1323) . The court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal as a matter of 
law, not of fact. See Slip Opinion at 17-18. Brown's did not seek 
dismissal of the Olches' counterclaim for "lack of evidence". 
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The Olches therefore candidly admit the trial court conducted 
a trial by summary judgment with no notice. The Olches' arrogant 
assertion that Brown's produced during that two-hour hearing all 
the evidence it would have introduced during a two-week trial is 
palpably fatuous. At trial Brown's would have introduced 
handwritten notations Jon Olch, Henry Sigg or their attorney made 
on a July 12, 1994 letter from Tom Brown. On page two, one of the 
defendants or their attorney wrote: "Final lease -> make it 
unsignable for Lessee [Brown's]." (emphasis added) (Brown's 
attaches a copy of those marginal notations as Exhibit "A") . On 
November 11, 1994, shortly after receiving Brown's objections to 
the Olches' "unsignable" final lease proposal, the Olches' 
attorney, Gordon Strachan, wrote Jon Olch: "We need to send 
[Brown's] a 'termination of good faith negotiations' letter by 
November 16." (Brown's attaches a copy of that letter as Exhibit 
IIQII) 
Brown's marked 132 documents as exhibits for trial. Neither 
the trial court nor the Court of Appeals was aware — due to the 
procedure the trial court adopted — of those documents, including 
the two referred to above. Brown's documentary evidence, along 
with the oral evidence it expected to offer through direct and 
cross examination, presented a jury question of whether the Olches 
ever intended to honor their agreement with Brown's. 
The Court of Appeals has designated its Opinion for 
publication. Published Utah appellate law now sanctions truncated 
bench "trials" with no notice. This procedure may be an efficient 
way of dispensing with jury trials, but is contrary to longstanding 
legions of decisions of this Court. 
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II. THIS COURT SHOULD REEXAMINE PINGREE, SINE AND TSERN. 
The Court has before it onLy a Petition for Certiorari. In 
its Petition Brown's calls the Court's attention to the fact that 
§ 4.3 of Corbin, the sole non-Utah authority this Court relied on 
in Tsern, is directly contrary to Tsern's holding. The simple fact 
that this Court's acknowledged authority contradicts this Court's 
decisions should persuade the Court that further briefing is 
necessary on whether the Court should explain or overrule Pingree, 
Sine and Tsern. The conflict between those decisions and § 4.3 
provides the "good reason" the Olches' assert is lacking. 
The briefs to be filed upon a grant of certiorari are the 
proper forum to explore the policies Corbin adopts in reaching its 
conclusions. A petition cannot adequately address those policies 
in the confines of a certiorari petition. Nevertheless, one of the 
Olches' own two cited authorities provides a window into some of 
the policies that underlie the conclusions of § 4.3: 
In contracts which make no provisions for 
termination in the event future agreement is not reached 
the intent of the parties becomes an issue to be 
explored. In May Metropolitan Corp. v. May Oil Burner 
Corp., 290 N.Y. 260, 263-265, 49 N.E.2d 13, 15-16) the 
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment dismissing the 
complaint insofar as it sought enforcement of a contract 
containing a renewal clause providing that the precise 
"quota" amounts in a distributorship agreement were "to 
be mutually agreed upon." "We do not think," the court 
declared, "that our search for the meaning of this 
renewal clause comes to a full stop as soon as the phrase 
'mutually agreed upon' is encountered." If the parties 
intended the agreement to be binding only if a mutually 
satisfactory agreement be reached, then "until they 
arrive at that point," the court said, "there is no 
contract"—but it concluded that the plaintiff should have 
the opportunity of "exploring before a jury" the entire 
issue of intent. 
There is no practical reason why lease provisions 
providing for future agreement as to some material term 
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of a contract should be excepted from the rule 
articulated in May or be treated as merely precatory. 
• * * 
Thus, we hold that (1) a renewal clause in a lease 
providing for future agreement on the rent to be paid 
during the renewal term is enforceable if it is 
established that the parties' intent was not to terminate 
in the event of a failure to agree; and (2) under such 
circumstances, in the absence of another standard 
provided for in the agreement, the court is not precluded 
from fixing a reasonable rent. To the extent that [three 
specified decisions] hold to the contrary, we now 
expressly overrule them. (Emphasis added). 
Joseph Martin, Jr. Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 419 N.Y.S.2d 
558, 561-62, 564 (App. Div. 1979). 
Schumacher is apparently one of the two most favorable 
judicial opinions2 the Olches could find. Yet it expressly 
overruled decisions reaching the same legal conclusions as Pingree, 
Sine and Tsern. There are numerous policy reasons why this Court 
should re-examine and either clarify or overrule those decisions. 
In doing so, this Court should declare specifically enforceable 
agreements to set renewal rents at "fair market value.3" This 
Court should grant certiorari so it can explore and consider those 
policies. 
2
 The New York Court of Appeals reversed the opinion the Olches 
rely on. See Joseph Martin Jr. Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 
417 N.E. 2d 541 (N.Y. 1981). Corbin § 4.3 roundly criticizes that 
reversal as ignoring "the obvious intent to contract and enrichment 
of the landlord at the tenant's expense. . ." 1 Joseph M. Perillo, 
Corbin on Contracts § 4.3 (rev. ed. 1993) at 571-72. 
3
 The Olches repeatedly assert that the statute of frauds dooms 
Brown's claims. The statute of frauds is analytically irrelevant 
because John Olch wrote Brown's on August 5, 1994: "So that there 
is absolutely no misunderstanding on your part, the figure which 
would be used as a 'gross volume figure from which to base 
additional rent', is a figure which would compensate the landlord 
for the fair market value of that leased space." (Emphasis added). 
(Brown's has attached a copy of that letter as Exhibit "C"). 
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DATED June S 1998. 
Respectfully submitted: 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By_ fkWLSL 
Bruce Wycoff 
Attorneys for\^gfet!rlCioners 
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Appendix A 
'Brown* Shoe $it COMPANY 
GENERAL OFFICES • 846 HIGUERA STREET. SUITE 2 
SAN LUIS OBISPO. CALIFORNIA 93401 
TELEPHONE 541-2732 • AREA CODE 805 
July 12, 1994 I u PLAINTIFF'S 
| EXHIBIT 
FAX COPY LL/u,:^ 3^p 
To: Henry Sigg F O R Y O U R E Y E S O N L Y 
Henry: Understand the following is only a 
loose association of my thoughts. 
This is not any sort of offer. I 
look forward to hearing from you. 
From: Tom Brown 
Re: Outline of current lease status and options that 
might be explored. 
Since our meeting last Friday I have had time to reflect on some of the things 
we discussed. I hope that since we met you also have spent a little time 
thinking about some of the options that could be created which would be 
beneficial to all of us. This letter is an attempt to share with you some insight 
into my thinking about some of the possibilities that might work out. As I 
suggested to you on the phone yesterday: It is impossible for me to do more 
than just present my side of the equation. You are the one that knows just 
where all the "players" are and what negotiations that have continued to be 
played out on a day to day basis. 
c Probably the most important thing to mention is that I realize just why 330 
&<•"' Partners would now like to have Browns find another location. The offer from 
Dansk that you have before you is very inviting I'm sure But the fact sus/*<+ +° 
remains that Browns has moved ahead based on signed agreements for a *-c' 
lease space at 330 Main Street. If Browns is now being asked to consider 
other options, Brown's shouldn't also be asked to increase it's exposure 
beyond what it has agree too up to this date. Browns should also be * » 
compensated for anv increased expenses it will incur. - * o J>J>OI*OA.+*J <-ost . 
Please know that I feel Brown's Shoe Fit Co. has a location to open a store in 
Park City. This is a location to be built at 330 Main Street.(hereafter referred 
to as "330") If no other options are made available to Brown's this is the *-> c 
location that we will work toward occupying, sofcqed- -ho aw<*.£) «- u ^ « . . c 
During our meeting last Friday you asked me if Brown's had "any contingency \ 
• «-.*«.:- i^ ^-,»irtn was not ready on time or if offers made by other 
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interested parties in this location were to be considered by 330 Partners. At 
that time I said "no". The reason for that answer was that I didn't feel at that 
time, or do I currently have reason to believe, that Brown's won't be occupying 
the "330" location. - D * * ' * * ^ 
* T\*\o\ \tt)^A -^ ruatac i\ ons.*^ t\<*V»lft. Q^ Love*— 
I fully understand 330 Partners interest in this latest offer to rent the space ruy, • 
already negotiated for by Browns. If the offer of $30 a foot is indeed a *• v u - " J 
legitimate offer this is a sizeable increase in rental income to you and your 
partners. Even if there is a commission that needs to be paid out of that 
figure, it would still generate much more in income. In just working some of 
the figures (and my knowledge is limited in knowing just what all the figures 
are) it seems that there is a difference in just the first three years that could be 
more than $50,000 in increased rental income. This is only using the 
difference in income on the 1776 sq. ft. of the building that Brown's is 
scheduled to occupy! When you figure that the anticipated $30 a foot could 
also be applied to the remaining area in the building to be leased, the figure 
gets to be over $100,000 difference in just the first three years. 
Now having said all of this let me get down to what I think can be done by us 
that might move things on a bit and be the best thing for Henry, 330 Partners 
and Browns. I'm agreeable to work collaboratively to see if we can't all come 
up with a solution to this situation that is in the best interest of everyone 
involved. I'm sure that as I'm writing this letter you are continuing to work with 
Dansk and negotiating for space that Browns is scheduled to occupy. Be 
advised that Browns doesn't expect to be left "out in the street". Browns is 
willing to work with you and 330 Partners on this whole matter, but we will not 
be considered the "stepchild" in the negotiations. 
You are the one that knows all the different players and the different offers. 
Please forgive me if the following statements or assumptions that don't agree 
with the facts as you know them I'm only working off of what I know! But its 
seems apparent to me that the best thing is to see if we can't figure out how to 
get Browns to take the location that you currently occupy at 425 Main 
Street.(hereafter referred to as M425") 
Browns already has a sizable investment planning to occupy "330". Unless we 
can come up with something that doesn't have added financial burden to 
Browns, there is really no reason for us to make any different plans than we 
have been making and move ahead to occupy "330". 50(1312 
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I want to make sure this letter does not indicate to you anything other than 
what it is: This letter looks at what might be worked out to benefit all of the 
concerned parties! It in no way should be construed as thinking that Brown's 
is willing to leave on the table it's agreement to lease space at "330" unless 
further agreements for a different leased space are worked out that are 
agreeable to Browns. 
Before i left Park City this last time I decided that it might be best for me to do 
a little "contingency planning". You tweaked my imagination on how this whole 
puzzle might come together. So, after having discussed with you the possibility 
of the "425" location, I went down and looked at it. As far as I can see the 
only advantage of taking this room, over the one that we will be leasing, is that 
it has a date of occupancy that is a little more determinable. This really is the 
only evident advantage. Additionally, there are several things that make it 
much less advantageous. 
From the way it looks to me: A} The "usable" square feet of "425" are no 
greater than the usable of "330". Although there may be an additional 200 sq. 
ft. in "425", the actual usable doesn't seem to be any greater. So both rooms 
are approximately the same in size. B} There is no question that the cost to 
remodel/fixture "425" will be greater to Browns than design and fixture of "330". 
C} The anticipated rental of "425" would cost Browns at least $16,000 more 
for the first three years. 
Henry: I could go into all sort of calculations, figures and suppositions that 
could be used to support an argument that Browns shouldn't even consider a 
move from "330" to "425". The move doesn't make a lot of sense for Browns. 
But if you really are interested in getting Browns in business and 330 Partners 
a higher paying tenant into "330", then we should try to hammer out some sort
 n 
of agreement. This would also avoid any sort of possible future confrontation ^ , 
and get this whole matter resolved. From my point of view, it seems that * ty 
330 Partners should be coming to Browns with some sort of offer to get ' 
us to take "425". If they are seriously considering and offer from Dansk It 
Is solely to their benefit to see if Browns won't consider a possible move 
to another location. I really don't know why I should be all hot and bothered 
to make any additional commitments. Did I miss something here? 50G313 
Mr,,., howinn niupn the fnmnina statements, let me give you some idea of what 
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knowledge I have of the rents/agreements currentlv in place and these 
anticipated to be made in the future • 
1) Browns would consider ar ofter to move ri»r t's "3':-T location 
to "425" if there are no additic i a- costs, wowso \. • Brow r.. ' .p/*7 
2) Browns would have to work out a mutually agreeable lease with > ^ y v 
the landlord at "425". ' ^
 V i 
V* 
3) Because of the difference in the average rental that Browns ,,£ 
would be required to pay at "42T compared tc M'T T c- • *h* o? 
course of the first three years and tr e addit, »n;*; i*i.-K u:',»,*;ia- wii , ^ ^  
be necessary to remodel/fixture "42:" com ar^d (u 3'.: ', Bowns 
would expect an up front payment of $25,000 in order to make the 
move. 
4) If there is a monetary settlement that needs to oe made with 
you, in order to move your business out of "425" (and maybe a 
settlement to the other tenant in "425") this amount would need to 
be negotiated with 330 Partners. I'm sure 330 Paitners s-t that 
even if there are some up front costs to getting an agreer:.**.-»t 
worked out for Browns to move to "425" that this is to their benefit 
in order to get their $30 a foot tenant. Keep in'mind: Browns 
gets no benefit by giving up their lease space in "330" If 330 
Partners can make positive steps in order to ha' o -i-owns pack 
their bags and go down the street to "425" they -vcuid the^ 'iave 
the freedom to sign a tenant for $30 a foot for the entire building. 
I'm sure you have figured out how much Browns agreeing to move 
into "425" would mean in additional income at "330". 
Please note that I have not tried to share in what I anticipate will be a rather 
large profit by 330 Partners by Browns moving to "425". They need to 
recognize that I'm willing to give them the opportunity to kase the space they 
have already agreed to lease to Browns, but I don't see how they could 
possibly expect Browns to shoulder any additional burden without some 5QG314 
compensation. 
M e a s e Know llicai, i a;u muic u»u.i «•«.-..a • 
5CC315 
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out to everyone's benefit But it has to be fair and reasonable to everyone 
involved. 
I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience. 
Sincerely^^-
Tom 
5CG316 
Appendix B 
STRACHAN & STRACHAN 
. A UMITK) Luioirr COMTANT 
OldCrtvH?II.Upcuin 
520 KUif i Street 
P.(\Bck37l7 
P*i k Oty. Uah 64060-3747 
TM (601) M9-4111 Fax ($01) 643-942S 
November 11 f 1994 
Jon -Olch 
BALD EAGLK REALTY 
P.O. Dox '2040 
255 Main Street 
Parte City, Utah futwo 
Ro: Brown'c .Shoe. Pit 
Dear Jon: 
Enclosed 1P Brownie Shoo Pit counsol'c roeponee to 
our prbposed lease. • Atter you have reviewed it, please 
call me. Wo nood to .send them a "termination of good 
t'aith negotiations'" lAttior by November 16. 
Sincerely, 
STRACHAN & SlJRACHAH 
Cordon Strachan / J^^O 
GS 2 Vw 
Enclosure 
PLAINTIFF* 
EXHIBIT 
/A3 
50CJ354 
^>5^ AJD.^5--^3m^^J 
Appendix C 
RaldEa 
R C A L T Y < 
M PLAINTIFF'S | EXHIBIT 
•I ^ 
August 5, 1994 
Mr. Tom Brown 
Brown's Shoe Fit Company 
846 Higuera Street, #2 
San Luis Obispo, CA 93410 
Re: Possible Lease Terms: 
Park City, Utah 
330 Main Street 
Dear Tom: 
I have recently been advised by Henry Sigg of one or more telephone conversations 
between you and Henry regarding your intention to lease the above referenced property. Henry 
has informed me that you apparently consider the letter of intent (which was signed by you and 
Henry last March 18th) as a binding lease agreement. As you may not be aware, my wife, 
Janet, and I are the owners of the property on which we propose to build a commercial building 
in which you would like to lease retail space. The purpose of this letter is to let you know the 
position of myself and Janet regarding your intention to lease space in this building. 
I was involved in one meeting with you regarding your possible lease of space. This took 
place last February. In pursuing the financing for the proposed building, the bank wanted us to 
have a letter of intent from a prospective tenant in order to make a preliminary determination as 
to the viability of a construction loan and permanent loan for the building. In that context, 
Henry was instructed to prepare a preliminary letter of intent for use in the bank's evaluation of 
a possible loan application. Henry was not instructed by me or Janet; nor was he authorized by 
either of us to enter into a lease or any other agreement of ^ ny kind. 
The document which you signed on March 18th was, in terms of my understanding, a 
preliminary letter of intent that was prepared in the context of our discussions last February, and 
specifically, for the purpose of a possible loan application, and was subject to normal lease 
negotiations. In February it made no business sense to enter into a lease agreement with anyone 
at that early stage in the process. It barely makes sense now. In either event, it makes even less 
business sense to do so in a single sheet of paper. I am now informed by Henry that it is you 
position that this is a firm lease agreement. If that is in fact your position, I must inform your 
that both Janet and I respectfully disagree with you. 
255 Main Street • P.O. Box 2040 • Park City, Utah 84060 
Phone: 801-649-4212 • Fax: 801-649^232 • Toll Free: 1-800-645^212 
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Let me explain to you what my areas of concern are as it relates to your intention to lease 
the space in this building. First of all, Henry's discussions with you (and my brief discussion) 
operated on the basic premise that the building would be ready for occupancy by the end of 
1994. The per square foot lease rates discussed in the letter of intent also presumed occupancy 
by the end of this year. If you are not already aware, I need to inform you that in view of the 
present project approval delays at Park City Municipal Corporation, I cannot anticipate 
commencing construction until this fall, if then. We will under no circumstances be in a position 
to deliver a completed building by the end of this year. Therefore, the base lease rate will need 
to be reevaluated to correspond with a 1995 (completion date for the building. 
With further reference to the lease rate, you will note that the March 18th document 
refers to two separate option periods and the need for the parties to come to an agreement on 
what the lease rate will be at the commencement of those option terms. So that there is 
absolutely no misunderstanding on your part, the figure which would be used as a "gross volume 
figure from which to base additional rent*, is a figure which would compensate the landlord for 
the fair market value of that leased space. In other words, at minimum, the lease rate at the 
commencement of the first and second option periods would be reflective of the fair market value 
for that space at the time the respective options are exercised. That is why the language is in 
there. 
Furthermore, as was clearly understood at the time, I would need to be in a position to 
recapture some of the losses incurred during the first three years of the lease as a result of 
offering a lower entry lease rate as a inducement to the tenant to come in and establish a new 
business. Stated simply the entry rate is subsidized. The recapture of the rent subsidy woulc 
also have to be factored in to the base rate calculated for each of the two option periods. Before 
there can be a binding lease, we would need to negotiate, among other items discussed above, 
the specific language for the option periods. 
In addition to the subject of the lease rate, there is equally significant factor of the actual 
space in the building which you intend to occupy. In my discussions with you last February, as 
well as in discussions you have had with Henry, you discussed aspects of all three of the floors 
in the building, with no precise determination of the final configuration for the lease space. It 
is not clear to me now, nor was it clear to me last February, just exactly what space you intended 
to finally occupy upon completion of the building. I think you can clearly understand the 
difficulty in assessing a generic lease rate when you may occupy one of more floors in the 
building including the main floor. 
I think the above discussion points out the concerns I have in your apparent assertion that 
you have a binding lease agreement with me. There are simply too many very significant issues 
that have not been resolved at this time - not in the least of which is that fact that our discussions 
early last spring anticipated your occupancy of a building this coming December. That is simply 
not going to happen. Although I can certainly understand your frustration, I think you can 
understand my position. Regardless of any differences we may have at present, let me assure 
you that I am willing to sit down and personally discuss with you the terms under which I would 
Be willing to enter into a binding lease agreement. 
5Q0321 
If we can work out the appropriate specific language in a manner that is acceptable to 
both of us, we can then move forward with a lease. We are still interested in pursuing 
discussions with you, but there are a lot of issues to be resolved. I would suggest that we delay 
any firm discussions until such time as I complete the approval process with Park City. When 
the approval process is completed, I will be able to obtain some accurate construction cost figures 
which will enable us both to realistically look at lease rates and the related issues of completion 
and occupancy dates, etc. 
Again, I regret the misunderstanding that has developed and I am hopeful that when this 
project is approved by the City, we can sit down and hammer out a mutually satisfactory lease 
agreement. If you are willing to pursue lease negotiations based on the input I have provided 
you in this letter, please let me know by August 15, 1994. If I do not hear back from you by 
that date, I will assume that you have no interest in pursuing a lease. In the event you do contact 
me, I would request that we meet jointly with Henry so that we are all in agreement. I look 
forward to hearing from you. 
Smcerely, 
Jon Olch 
cc: Henry Sigg 
Janet Olch 
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